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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PLC LANDSCAPE CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PICCADILLY FISH 'N CHIPS INC. 





C. DeMONT JUDD, JR. 
521 Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Respondent 
STRONG, POELMAN & FOX 
Harold A. Hintze 
700 El Paso Gas Building 
315 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is a landscape construction company 
located at 1418 Wall Avenue, Ogden, Utah. Near the 
time of completion of the construction of the defendant's 
restaurant, defendant discussed with plaintiff the pos-
sibility of plaintiff providing the landscaping and exterior 
design for the restaurant. Negotiations commenced be-
tween the respective parties wherein various designs and 
their respective prices were discussed. The negotiations 
yielded an agreement which provided that the defendant 
pay the plaintiff the sum of $4581.30 and defendant must 
supply plaintiff with some hand labor if plaintiff was to 
complete the project for $4581.30. The defendant failed 
to provide all of the hand labor necessary if the project 
was to be completed on time. As a result it was necessary 
for plaintiff to perform the work. After the landscaping 
had been completed the respective parties met to adjust 
the price previously agreed upon. Because of the addition-
al labor involved, total price of work and materiah 
furnished was $6669.53. Defendant thereafter paid 
plaintiff the sum of $5500.00 but refused to pay an ad· 
ditional $1169.53 which he owed the plaintiff for wort 
and materials furnished. Upon defendant's refusal to 
pay the additional amount due, plaintiff commenced an 
action to recover the $1169.53. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried in Ogden on the 24th day al 
June 1971, before the Honorable Calvin Gould, one ol 
the judges of the Second Judicial District. At the con· 
clusion of the plaintiff's case, the court took under ad· 
visement defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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said motion being based on the premise that plaintiff 
had filed to establish a prima facie case, stating, "I will 
take the motion under advisement. But at this point, Mr. 
Hintze, it would appear to me that except for the actions 
of your party, there was a contract. And it was their 
failure to perform that put the case into a quantum 
meruit type situation. If your parties had performed with 
respect to labor, we would be dealing with a contract 
case." On June 28, 1971, Judge Gould entered a Memor-
andum Decision finding the issues in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendant with judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $1165.53, plus costs. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
I. Court was correct in granting plaintiff judgment 
and in failing to grant defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
A. Defendant seeks reversal on grounds that 
court should have granted them Summary Judgment 
because it failed to prove quantum meruit should be 
denied. 
B. Plaintiff proved that an express contract did 
exist between the parties. Plaintiff's evidence estab-
lished reasonable value of the materials and labor 
provided. 
C. Supreme Court has not reversed trial court 
when sufficient evidence exists to support court's 
ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The court in its Memorandum Decision by grant-
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ing the plaintiff's judgment in effect ruled against the 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Court by its 
ruling found sufficient evidence in the testimony by the 
witnesses to grant plaintiff's judgment. 
A. Defendant's reversal on the grounds that 
the court should have granted them Summary Judg-
ment because plaintiff failed to prove quantum 
meruit should be denied. 
Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
states: "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried 
by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings; such amendment of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause to conform to the evidence and to 
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If 
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is 
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court 
may allow the pleadings to be amended when the pre-
sentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court 
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him 
in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. 
The court shall grant a continuance,if necessary, to en-
able the objecting part to meet such evidence." 
Rule 15(b) clearly states that the plaintiff's election 
to proceed under a theory of express contract rather than 
a quantum meruit was the proper approach to take since 
it enabled them to make their pleadings conform more 
precisely to the evidence. 
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In Jackson v. Cope, 266 P 2d 500, I Utah 2d 330, 
(54) the court stated; "Where plaintiff's amendment 
to pre trial order was made to conform to evidence and 
new issue introduced thereby was such as could be' con-
veniently and effectively handled in trial without injury 
to substative rights, and defendants did not claim that 
they had been surprised by the evidence or had not been 
given an opportunity to meet it, amendment of pre-trial 
order was clearly in futherance of justice." In the case at 
hand this is clearly the circumstances which exist. Plain-
tiff proceeds in the manner which made his initial plead-
ings more concisely conform to the evidence. Further 
more, the defendant makes no objection to the Findings 
of Fact. In failing to take issue with the trial court's find-
ings of fact, the defendant in effect acknowledges that 
they were not surprised by the evidence. As a result, we 
can only conclude that the procedure taken by the plain-
tiff was clearly in futherance of justice. 
B. Plaintiff proved that an express contract 
existed between the parties and plaintiff's evidence 
established reasonable value of the materials and 
labor provided. 
The court in its Memorandum Decision determined, 
"that it couldn't reconcile the testimony of the witnesses 
and determined the testimony of Mr. Dale Cook to be 
lucid and concise." Mr. Cook's background and record 
includes the following: 
1. He is now employed by Research Homes. 
2. Prior to this he was employed by PLC 
Landscape Construction full time for six years and 
part time for two years. 
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3. During the period he was employed by PLC 
he worked on construction crews until he eventually 
became a supervisor. He also did some designing as 
a Landscape Architect, made estimates and made 
some client contracts. 
The testimony of the witness Dale Cook clearly out-
lines the reasonable value of the materials supplied and 
the work performed. Mr. Cook's testimony also points out 
the fact that an express contract existed between the 
parties. 
Mr. Cook had several contracts with Piccadilly's 
principal, Gary Smith, in which they discussed what de-
sign the defendant was interested in and relative costs. 
Q. What was your estimate when you first 
went and talked to him about the plan and estimate? 
A. It was Seven Thousand Three Hundred and 
something. 
Q. Now when you presented the $7,413.00 
estimate to him, you also presented a detailed blue-
print, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
After this initi'al estimate was made, further ne-
gotiatfons were necessary for the parties to reach a final 
agreement. 
Q. At this point was there negotiation with 
respect to the ultimate price? 
A. He told me when he saw the first price, "! 
can't spend that much ...... I think I can spend 
$4,500.00" 
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Q. And did you come back with a revised bid? 
A. I went back to the office and proceeded to 
find a way to cut it down to $4,500.00. And as is the 
case usually when the client wants to cut it down, 
(he) wants to do some of the labor himself, we take 
out as much of the labor as we feel a layman can do 
competently with our supervision." 
In addition to the defendant providing some hand 
labor, other changes were made including "cutting out 
some of the concrete work: and "the use of planting lawn 
with seed rather than using pre-grown sod, which is more 
. " expensive. 
Q. So what was your final agreement with re-
spect to the amount of net total bid that you would 
do the job for? 
A. Now as I called him on the phone and we 
talked about it to tell him that we could get it down, 
I told him that we found we would do these things. 
I hold him on the phone what they were. If we could 
do that, then we could put the job as was talked 
about for $4,581.30. 
Q. Now after, on the telephone, you agreed to 
do it for $4,581.30. Did you receive authorization 
to go forward? 
A. He said, "Yes, let's get started on it ...... " 
As a result of the negotiations and the agreements 
which were made between the parties, one must conclude 
that an expressed contract did exist between the parties, 
as the trial court found. 
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From the time of the agreement by the parties to 
have the job performed for $4,581.30, due to the defen. 
dant's failure to perform, the plaintiff was required to 
supply additional labor and material whos reasonable 
value resulted in a final bill of $6,669.53. 
Defendant failed to do the labor which he had 
agreed to do and for which the original bid was lowered. 
Q. After you began the work . . . . were there 
any changes made? 
A. . . . . We started getting ready to a point 
where the labor he (defendant) was going to do 
hadn't been done, and it was almost to start holding 
us up .... I believe I talked with defendants occa· 
sionally, two or three times, I can't remember for 
sure. And he would say, well we have got to get it 
done, so you guys go ahead and we will work this 
out later. 
Q. So that (fence) was taken out initially and 
put back in? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that the $4,581.30 bid was increased by 
some labor and by a fence, is that correct? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. And were there any other increases? 
A. Yes, there were ..... There were some con· 
crete caps that we put on some of the brick ':a~! 
around the front which was agreed upon to get it 
done. 
Q. Did you submit a final bill? 
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A. Yes, we did. I got a first down payme!lt right 
after we had started and a midway payment in the 
middle. And I kind of went over the cost of things a 
little bit then. I warned him that it was coming right 
back up to where the original bid was again because 
we were having to do all the labor that was sup-
posedly taken out. And he said: "Well, we have got 
to get it done, you know, and we can't do it, so we 
will work it out as the final billing comes." And at 
the final billing I went over the whole job and show-
ed him what happened ...... . 
The trial court in "determining the testimony of 
Dale Cook to be lucid and concise," concluded from the 
evidence supplied by his testimony that the reasonable 
value of the additional materials and labor supplied by 
the plaintiff did in fact result in a final cost of $6,669.53. 
E. The Supreme Court has not reversed the trial 
court when sufficient evidence exists to support the 
court's ruling. 
It is clear from the court's Memorandum Decision 
that the testimony of Dale Cook provided it with suf-
ficient evidence to determine that the defendant should 
pay the plaintiff the full amount of the final bill submit-
ted. 
In Leen Glazier and Sons, Inc. v Larsen, 491 P 2d 
266 (Utah 1971), the court stated that "On appeal from 
judgments of no cause of action in action at law, Supreme 
Court would not review evidence or attempt to substitute 
its judgment for that of trial court." It was further stated 
that, "If there is substantial evidence to support judg-
ment of court below in action at law, Supreme Court will 
affirm." 
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Also in First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed 
Co., 492 P 2d, 132 (Utah 1971) the Court declared that 
"It will on appeal survey the evidence in a light favorabl~ 
to trial court's findings." 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff was not required to proceed under a 
quantum meruit procedure because of Rule 15(d) of the 
Utah Code Annotated and because the Supreme Court 
has ruled in similar situations that amendment to the 
pre-trial order was in the furtherance of justice. And the 
plaintiff as indicated in the testimony of the witness, 
Dale Cook, which was accepted by the trial court, did 
prove the performance of work and the reasonable value 
thereof. As a result of the conclusions, the case should 
be upheld and judgment granted to the plaintiff. 
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